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COMMENT
A FRAUDULENT SCHEME’S PARTICULARITY UNDER
RULE 9(B) OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE
Charis Ann Mitchell†
ABSTRACT
While the False Claims Act is one of the federal government’s most
successful tools in recovering money received under a false claim, there
remains room for improvement. Under the False Claims Act, a citizen,
known as a relator, may bring a lawsuit, a qui tam action, on behalf of the
government when the relator knows of a company or individual cheating
the government. However, this concept has been undermined by the courts’
improper application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), where it
states that fraud must be stated with particularity. Not only does Rule 9(b)
not properly apply to a qui tam action, but the courts also insist on holding a
relator to an impossible standard of particularity.
Although some courts have attempted to give a relator a relaxed pleading
standard, each attempt has been unsuccessful due to one point: the court
focuses on particular pleading in the wrong element of an action under the
False Claims Act. In order to state a cause of action under the Act, the
relator must plead: (1) there was a claim for a federal fund; (2) the claim
was false; and (3) the defendant knew of its falsity. The judiciary has been
demanding a relator plead the first two elements with particularity, meaning
that the relator must identify a specific claim.
Such an application undermines the qui tam provisions of the False
Claims Act and improperly restricts the relator, who has no access to the
claims themselves, since a relator is not a real party in interest in a qui tam
action. Therefore, this Comment proposes that Rule 9(b) should apply only
to a relator’s pleading of a specific fraudulent scheme—that is, applying
Rule 9(b) to the third element of an action under the Act.

† Charis Ann Mitchell received her J.D. from Liberty University School of Law in
2009, where she graduated summa cum laude as valedictorian of her class. Her term as law
clerk for the Honorable Eric G. Bruggink of the United States Court of Federal Claims
begins in August 2010, and she is a member of the Virginia State Bar. She would like to
thank her brother, Michael, and her parents, Michael and Sharyn, for their continual support,
love, and encouragement. She also thanks Professor Joel D. Hesch for his insight during the
writing of this Comment.
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The House of Representatives is currently proposing to fix this
discrepancy between the False Claims Act and the rules of procedure. If the
legislation is successful, the relator will be granted appropriate leeway in
the relator’s pleading, providing a balance between pleading with
particularity under Rule 9(b) and pleading a short and plain statement under
Rule 8. Such a legislative amendment will functionally override Rule 9(b),
and solve the problem that has surfaced in the courts.
Whether the legislature is successful or not, this Comment proposes a
standard workable under the current state of the law that will cease
undermining the False Claims Act and the relators’ ability to bring actions
on behalf of the United States.
I. INTRODUCTION
The False Claims Act (FCA) is the federal government’s primary antifraud tool.1 Through the assistance of willing citizens throughout the
country, the United States Department of Justice has been able to recover
over $21 billion from false claims since the FCA was amended in 1986.2
Nearly seventy-eight percent of that recovery is associated with suits
brought by private citizens on behalf of the government. These citizens,
called “relators,” bring these suits under the qui tam provisions of the
FCA.3
While not directly a “fraud” statute, it is nearly unanimous among the
courts that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure4 9(b)5 applies to these qui tam6
1. The False Claims Act (FCA) is located at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2006).
2. Press Release, Department of Justice, More than $1 Billion Recovered by Justice
Department in Fraud and False Claims in Fiscal Year 2008 (Nov. 10, 2008), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/November/08-civ-992.html.
3. Id.
4. For space and brevity, this Comment will abbreviate “Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure” as FRCP and refer to individual rules as merely “Rule” with a number following.
5. FRCP 9(b) states, “In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity
the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other
conditions of a person's mind may be alleged generally.” FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
6. The term “qui tam” is “short for the Latin phrase qui tam pro domino rege quam pro
se ipso in hac parte sequitur, which means ‘who pursues this action on our Lord the King’s
behalf as well as his own.’” Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529
U.S. 765, 769 n.1 (2000) (emphasis added). A “relator” is the formal term for the
colloquialism “whistleblower,” the private citizen who reports the fraud. See United States
ex rel. Karvelas v. Melrose-Wakefield Hosp., 360 F.3d 220, 225 n.7 (1st Cir. 2004) (“A
‘relator’ is ‘[a] party in interest who is permitted to institute a proceeding in the name of the
People or the Attorney General when the right to sue resides solely in that official.’ Black’s
Law Dictionary 1289 (6th ed. 1990).”)
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complaints brought under the FCA.7 Rule 9(b) has a significant impact
upon the relator and the case he filed on behalf of the government.
When a Rule 9(b) motion is filed against a relator’s complaint, the
motion is treated as a motion for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).8 A motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim is “viewed with disfavor and [is] rarely
granted.”9 Curiously, this is contrary to the incessant application of Rule
9(b) to qui tam complaints and the frequent dismissals throughout the
circuits. Under this standard, if a relator fails to satisfy Rule 9(b), his
complaint may be dismissed with prejudice,10 causing the relator no longer
to be able to pursue the cause of action on behalf of the government.
Rule 9(b) requires that any charges of fraud be pled with particularity,11
and the courts have applied the Rule to every element of an FCA
complaint.12 In applying Rule 9(b) to each specific element, many courts
demand that the relator identify a specific false claim for payment or an
invoice provided to the government. However, such an application
undermines the purposes of the FCA by holding the relator to an
unattainable standard of particularity. Therefore, Rule 9(b) should be
applied only to whether the relator pled a scheme with particularity.
Even while clinging to this inaccurate application, some circuits have
attempted to apply a modified standard of pleading for a qui tam
complaint.13 Some courts evaluate whether a complaint has sufficient
indicia of reliability,14 and some may relax the standard of particularity
7. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 355 F.3d 370
(5th Cir. 2004); United States ex rel. Aflatooni v. Kitsap Physician Serv., 314 F.3d 995 (9th
Cir. 2001).
8. See, e.g., United States ex rel. SNAPP, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 532 F.3d 496 (6th
Cir. 2008).
9. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Consol. Fibers, Inc., 7 F. Supp. 2d 822, 824
(N.D. Tex. 1998). “A dismissal for failure to state a claim is disfavored in the law and
justified only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support
of his claim that would entitle him to relief.” In re U.S. Abatement Corp., 39 F.3d 556, 559
(5th Cir. 1994). Further, courts “will only rarely encounter circumstances which justify
granting such a motion.” Mahone v. Addicks Util. Dist. of Harris County, 836 F.2d 921, 926
(5th Cir. 1988). Both U.S. Abatement Corp. and Mahone are quoted in JAMES B. HELMER,
JR., FALSE CLAIMS ACT: WHISTLEBLOWER LITIGATION 357 (3d ed. 2002).
10. Frequently the relator will first be dismissed with leave to amend the complaint, but
the ultimate result is that the complaint is dismissed with prejudice.
11. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
12. As discussed below, every action under the FCA demands that three elements be
met: (1) there was a claim for a federal fund; (2) the claim was false; and (3) the defendant
knew of its falsity.
13. See infra Part V.
14. See infra Part IV.A.
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when the defendant has exclusive access to the proof of the case.15
Nevertheless, even these courts continue to miss the mark by continuing to
focus on and require the pleading of a specific false claim.
With the purposes of the FCA and the contemporary pleading rules in
mind, this Comment proposes that the current disarray and misapplication
of Rule 9(b) in the circuits be solved with a simple standard to evaluate a
complaint’s particularity. While Rule 9(b) retains an important function in
the judicial system, in the context of a qui tam claim under the FCA, it is
essential that the courts apply Rule 9(b) to the defendant’s knowledge of the
fraudulent scheme, thus rejecting the demand for identification of a specific
claim for payment in the complaint. Since the relator is not the actual party
in interest in a qui tam action, most relators do not have access to a cheating
defendant’s billing documents and invoices, and therefore should be
allowed to plead the defendant’s fraudulent scheme, that is, the defendant’s
knowledge of the falsity of a claim for payment. In addition, relators should
not be forced into the impossible situation of pleading each fraudulent
invoice.16 This standard fulfills the purposes of imposing particularized
pleading, while also satisfying the purposes underlying the FCA itself.
This Comment also addresses the proposed House Revision dubbed the
“False Claims Act Correction Act of 2007,” which offers an alternative
solution to the circuit confusion.17 The House of Representatives’
proposal18 offers appropriate protections for qui tam defendants while
balancing the government’s great need for the dedicated relators who assist
the government in recovering billions of dollars obtained by submitting
false claims to the government.19 This Comment also discusses the legality
of such a legislative provision and its ability to functionally override the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Part II of this Comment discusses the history of the FCA, Rule 9(b), and
the interrelationship of the two. Part III addresses the disastrous results that
occur when the courts stringently apply Rule 9(b) to the claim-for-payment
element of a qui tam action. The various attempts to relax pleading are then
discussed in Part IV, followed in Part V by a discussion of why Rule 9(b)
should not be applied to a qui tam complaint. Since courts have incorrectly
but relentlessly applied Rule 9(b) to an FCA action, Part VI proposes a
15. See infra Part IV.A.
16. See infra Part VI.
17. False Claims Act Correction Act of 2007, H.R. Res. 4854, 110th Cong. § 4(e)
(2007).
18. The Senate’s version of the bill does not retain a fix for the Rule 9(b) split, and the
Senate should be encouraged to adopt the House’s version of the bill.
19. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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standard according to which the courts should apply Rule 9(b) to a qui tam
complaint. Part VII discusses and evaluates the merits of the House of
Representatives’ proposal to amend the FCA and remedy the current
misapplication of the Rule. Part VIII briefly concludes.
II. A BACKGROUND OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND RULE 9(B)
A. A Brief History of the False Claims Act
The False Claims Act was enacted in 1863 during the Civil War in order
to stop contractors from committing fraud against the military.20 Due to the
amount of false claims submitted, the FCA was implemented and allowed
knowledgeable citizens to bring qui tam actions against anyone who
submitted a false claim to the United States Government.21 “Such persons,
known as ‘relators,’” became “private attorneys general who were rewarded
for prosecuting the action by receiving 50 percent of all monies recovered
in the suit.”22 Although the FCA was not facially a “fraud” statute, the
intent of passing the FCA was clear: to “prevent and punish frauds upon the
government of the United States” and include the average citizen in the
battle.23
Despite the need for qui tam actions to help the government recover
falsely obtained money, the FCA was used infrequently.24 In the early part
of the 1940s, the FCA was amended to prevent people from filing qui tam
complaints based upon actions that had already been instituted in the
criminal courts. Once an indictment was brought, the relator would then file
a qui tam against the same individual for the same claim.25 These
“parasitic” lawsuits did not satisfy the purpose of the FCA, but rather
undermined the allowance of the Attorney General to control the litigation
20. United States ex rel. Minn. Ass’n of Nurse Anesthetists v. Allina Health Sys. Corp.,
276 F.3d 1032, 1041 (8th Cir. 2002).
21. HELMER, supra note 9. The Union military was suffering from massive instances of
fraud and misrepresentations. “Reports of munitions filled with sawdust rather than
explosives and boots made of cardboard rather than leather abounded. Union soldiers opened
crates of muskets, only to find them filled with sawdust instead of firearms.” Id. at 35. For a
comprehensive summary of the history of the FCA, see HELMER, supra note 9, at 34-61.
22. HELMER, supra note 9, at 34.
23. Id. at 36 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 348 (1863)); see CLAIRE M.
SYLVIA, FALSE CLAIMS ACT: FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT 38 (2004). The FCA was, in
essence, “setting a rogue to catch a rogue” by encouraging an individual to turn on the fraud
doer and report the fraud to the government. United States ex rel. Foulds v. Tex. Tech.
Univ., 171 F.3d 279, 293 (5th Cir. 1999).
24. SYLVIA, supra note 23, at 46.
25. HELMER, supra note 9, at 43.
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against those defrauding the government,26 spurring the FCA amendments
in 1943.27 The result of these amendments was that the effectiveness of the
FCA was drastically limited in assisting the government to recover money
wrongfully obtained.28
When the government was faced once again with rampant fraud against
the military, Congress reevaluated the FCA and determined it was essential
to amend the statute.29 The 1986 Amendments, signed into law by President
Reagan, enabled the government to intervene in a qui tam action,30 allowed
the original complaint to be filed under seal for sixty days,31 granted the
original source exception to the public disclosure bar,32 prohibited
retaliation against a relator,33 and guaranteed a relator a minimum
percentage award in a successful qui tam action.34 Congress made further
26. See SYLVIA, supra note 23, at 47; United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S.
537 (1943). Hess is the landmark case that spurred the 1943 amendments to the FCA. In
Hess, the Supreme Court held that under the original FCA, a relator may bring a civil qui
tam action against someone even if there was already a criminal indictment on file. In
response,
Attorney General Francis Biddle asked Congress to repeal the qui tam
provisions of the False Claims Act. Congress refused to go so far, but it did
amend the Act to provide that there would be no jurisdiction over qui tam suits
whenever it shall be made to appear that such suit was based upon evidence or
information in the possession of the United States, or any agency, officer or
employee thereof, at the time such suit was brought.
United States ex rel. Minn. Ass’n of Nurse Anesthetists v. Allina Health Sys. Corp., 276
F.3d 1032, 1041 (8th Cir. 2002) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
27. SYLVIA, supra note 23, at 46. The key amendment from 1943 was the public
disclosure bar, preventing these lawsuits. See, e.g., Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States ex
rel. Stone, 549 U.S. 457 (2007). For a discussion of the public disclosure bar and the original
source exception issues presented in the Rockwell decision, see Joel D. Hesch, Restating the
“Original Source Exception” to the False Claims Act’s “Public Disclosure Bar,” 1 LIBERTY
U. L. REV. 111 (2006).
28. HELMER, supra note 9, at 47. The 1943 Amendments undermined the effectiveness
of the Act in inciting relators to come forward and bring qui tam actions on behalf of the
government. A percentage award was no longer guaranteed, the percentage was dramatically
decreased, and the government had to lack knowledge entirely when the action was filed or
else the action was dismissed. “While the elimination of the guaranteed bounty was
discouraging, the most devastating effect of the Amendments was the jurisdictional bar that
prevented any qui tam action unless the government lacked all knowledge of the fraud.” Id.
29. SYLVIA, supra note 23, at 53.
30. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2), (4) (2006 & Supp. 2009).
31. Id. § 3730(b)(2).
32. Id. § 3730(e)(4).
33. Id. § 3730(h).
34. HELMER, supra note 9, at 55-56. See generally 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733.
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minor amendments35 to the FCA in 1988, and this relator-friendly version
of the statute is the current law.36
Upon the successful 1986 amendments to the FCA, the FCA became the
government’s primary tool to recover federal funds wrongfully obtained.37
Of the approximately $1 billion recovered by the government in 2008,
relators filing qui tam actions38 were awarded $198 million.39
B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b): The Defendants’ Friend
In contrast to the movement toward notice pleading in Rule 8, where a
“short and plain statement” is adequate for pleading,40 Rule 9(b) proclaims
that “[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and
other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.”41 This
requirement reflects the historical practice of requiring specific pleading in
English and early American law.42 These two requirements do not
contradict each other, but flow into a complementary pleading system in

35. SYLVIA, supra note 23, at 59. These amendments limited the ability to recover as a
relator when the person was actually perpetrating the fraudulent scheme.
36. When the purposes of the FCA are evaluated, the history of the statute itself
demonstrates the legislative reliance on the relator. It is essential to allow a relator to bring a
qui tam claim and not impose an impossible standard of pleading, undermining the purpose
of the FCA and allowing fraudulent contracts to be maintained against the federal
government.
37. Aveco Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 884 F.2d 621, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
38. A relator is provided with substantive rights under the FCA. The relator has the right
to continue with the case if the government chooses to not intervene, a right to remain as a
joint plaintiff in the action, and a right to a percentage of the amount the government
recovers as a result of the action. See generally 31 U.S.C. § 3730. Without these rights and
the opportunity for a relator to bring a suit on behalf of the government, the federal
government would miss many opportunities to collect money paid out under fraudulent or
false means.
39. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, More than $1 Billion Recovered by Justice
Department in Fraud and False Claims in Fiscal Year 2008 (Nov. 10, 2008), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/November/08-civ-992.html.
40. FRCP 8(a)(2) provides, “A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R.
CIV. P. 8(a)(2). This rule leads to shorter complaints and a more efficient system of pleading
in the federal court system.
41. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
42. 5A CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1296, 30 (3d ed. 2004).

344

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:337

which a plaintiff is to plead concisely and clearly the requisite elements of
fraud to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim.43
The purposes of Rule 9(b) and its requirement of particularity have been
delineated by many federal courts.44 These purposes include protecting
defendants from frivolous claims,45 avoiding cases filed just for settlement
value,46 discouraging cases merely to reopen a completed transaction,47
deterring suits filed in an attempt merely to obtain discovery,48 enabling the
defendant to prepare an appropriate responsive pleading,49 and attempting
to disfavor cases alleging fraud.50 Courts rarely assign priority among these
purposes, though allowing the defendant to prepare an appropriate
responsive pleading is a prevalent concern.
While some of these purposes behind the requirement of particularity
under Rule 9(b) may be seen in a relator’s pleading under the FCA,
requiring a relator to plead a specific claim is shrouded in the language of
these purposes; however, it is questionable whether these purposes are
fulfilled by imposing the requirement of strict particularity.51 Nonetheless,
the requirement of Rule 9(b) remains the court-imposed interpretation for
all FCA qui tam pleadings.
43. Felton v. Walston & Co., 508 F.2d 577, 581 (2d Cir. 1974) (“[I]n applying [R]ule
9(b) we must not lose sight of the fact that it must be reconciled with [R]ule 8 which requires
a short and concise statement of claims.”).
44. See United States ex rel. Costner v. United States, 317 F.3d 883 (8th Cir. 2003);
United States ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., Inc., 290 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2002);
Koch v. Koch Indus., Inc., 203 F.3d 1202 (10th Cir. 2000); Hart v. Bayer Corp., 199 F.3d
239 (5th Cir. 2000); Ackerman v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 172 F.3d 467 (7th Cir. 1999);
Rolo v. City Investing Co. Liquidating Trust, 155 F.3d 644 (3d Cir. 1998); Banca Cremi,
S.A. v. Alex Brown & Sons, Inc., 132 F.3d 1017 (4th Cir. 1997); Campaniello Imports, Ltd.
v. Saporiti Italia S.P.A., 117 F.3d 655 (2d Cir. 1997); In re Stac Electronics Secs. Litig., 89
F.3d 1399 (9th Cir. 1996); McGinty v. Beranger Volkswagen, Inc., 633 F.2d 226 (1st Cir.
1980); In re Credit Acceptance Corp. Secs. Litig., 50 F. Supp. 2d 662 (E.D. Mich. 1999).
45. United Features Syndicate, Inc. v. Miller Features Syndicate, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d
198, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Since it is a serious matter to charge a person with fraud, a
plaintiff is not permitted to do so unless he is in a position and is willing to put himself on
record as to what the alleged fraud consists of specifically.” (citations omitted)).
46. See Creative Foods of Ind., Inc. v. My Favorite Muffin, Too, Inc., No. IP 01-0228C-T/K, 2002 WL 244584, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 14, 2002) (noting that Rule 9(b) discourages
inclusion of accusations in complaints “simply to gain leverage for settlement or for other
ulterior purposes”).
47. See Chamberlain Mach. Works v. United States, 270 U.S. 346 (1926).
48. See Wafra Leasing Corp. v. Prime Capital Corp., 247 F. Supp. 2d 987 (N.D. Ill.
2002).
49. See, e.g., Chisolm v. Transouth Fin. Corp., 164 F.3d 623 (4th Cir. 1998).
50. See Segal v. Gordon, 467 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1972).
51. See infra Parts III-VI.
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C. The Qui Tam Action and Its Relationship to Rule 9(b)
It has been universally held52 that Rule 9(b) applies to a qui tam
complaint.53 A prevailing reason for requiring a qui tam complaint to satisfy
Rule 9(b) is to enable the defendant to mount an appropriate defense;54 in
order to determine a complaint’s sufficiency under Rule 9(b), “the most
basic consideration . . . is the determination of how much detail is necessary
to give adequate notice [to the defendant] . . . and enable him to prepare a
responsive pleading.”55 Further, as the Sixth Circuit recently determined, a
relator is to plead with particularity in order to:
discourage[] fishing expeditions and strike suits which appear
more likely to consume a defendant’s resources than to reveal
evidences of wrongdoing. Because the defendant is informed of
which of its specific actions allegedly constitute fraud, it can
limit discovery and subsequent litigation to matters relevant to
these allegations. Additionally, Rule 9(b)’s particularity
requirement protects a qui tam defendant from unwarranted
damage to its reputation caused by spurious charges of immoral
and fraudulent behavior. Because the defendant is notified
immediately of the focus of a relator’s complaint, it can quickly
resolve frivolous disputes by attacking the narrow basis of an
allegation of fraud.56
Within the determination that the relator is to file a complaint that
complies with Rule 9(b) particularity, courts have been specific, though not

52. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Rost v. Pfizer, Inc., 507 F.3d 720 (1st Cir. 2007).
While numerous circuits have ruled on the application of Rule 9(b) to the FCA, the United
States Supreme Court has never evaluated the Rule’s application to qui tam actions under the
FCA.
53. The prevailing, and unreasonable, interpretation requires a relator to plead a specific
claim for payment in the complaint itself.
54. E.g., United States ex rel. SNAPP, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 532 F.3d 496, 505 (6th
Cir. 2008). Providing the defendant with adequate notice is one of the most cited purposes
by courts deciding motions for dismissal under Rule 9(b). “One possible rationale for this
treatment is the heightened possibility of spurious allegations in a qui tam suit. These cases
indicate that courts recognize the need to provide qui tam defendants with the full
protections provided by Rule 9(b).” JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND QUI TAM
ACTIONS § 5-04(B), at 5-49 (3d ed. Supp. 2008-2).
55. 5A CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1298 (3d ed. 2004).
56. SNAPP, Inc., 532 F.3d at 504 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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necessarily uniform, in delineating what such compliance looks like.57
Under the FCA, there are seven possible causes of action against a
defendant.58 Each of the violations requires three elements: (1) there was a
claim59 for a federal fund; (2) the claim was false; and (3) the defendant
57. This includes the Fifth Circuit, which erroneously applied Rule 9(b) by demanding
particularity even beyond the actual text of the rule. Rule 9(b) states in relevant part:
“Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged
generally.” FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). However, in United States ex rel. Williams v. Bell
Helicopter Textron Inc., the Fifth Circuit improperly dismissed the relator’s complaint
despite the relator attaching copies of the false claims submitted to the government and
names of violating employees along with pleading the relevant time period in 1998. United
States ex rel. Williams v. Bell Helicopter Textron Inc., 417 F.3d 450, 454 (5th Cir. 2005).
The court stated that even though the complaint alleged that “Bell Helicopter discovered
these false charges and failed to report them to the government,” the complaint did not
contain the appropriate level of detail as a basis for the defendant’s knowledge. Id. The Fifth
Circuit ignored the second half of Rule 9(b) that states that knowledge may be pled generally
and decided to arbitrarily apply the heightened pleading requirement even to the knowledge
element of the FCA action. Id. Williams stands as another example of courts misapplying the
Rule, and acting against the proper focus of a qui tam complaint: allowing the federal
government to benefit from the provision allowing a relator to bring an action on behalf of
the attorney general.
58. The FCA lists seven ways a person may violate the act. If a person
(1) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim
for payment or approval; (2) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or
used, a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim; (3)
conspires to commit a violation of [any of the six other methods]; (4) has
possession, custody, or control of property or money used, or to be used, by the
Government and knowingly delivers, or causes to be delivered, less than all of
that money or property; (5) is authorized to make or deliver a document
certifying receipt of property used, or to be used, by the Government and,
intending to defraud the Government, makes or delivers the receipt without
completely knowing that the information on the receipt is true; (6) knowingly
buys, or receives as a pledge of an obligation or debt, public property from an
officer or employee of the Government, or a member of the Armed Forces,
who lawfully may not sell or pledge property; or (7) knowingly makes, uses, or
causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to an obligation
to pay or transmit money or property to the Government, or knowingly
conceals or knowingly and improperly avoids or decreases an obligation to pay
or transmit money or property to the Government,
that person is liable. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2006 & Supp. 2009).
59. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(2) (defining “claim” in relevant part as, inter alia, “any request or
demand, whether under a contract or otherwise, for money or property and whether or not the
United States has title to the money or property, that . . . is made to a contractor, grantee, or
other recipient, if the money or property is to be spent or used on the Government’s behalf or to
advance a Government program or interest, and if the United States Government provides or
has provided any portion of the money or property requested or demanded”).

2010]

A FRAUDULENT SCHEME’S PARTICULARITY

347

knew of its falsity.60 Typically, most courts require that the relator plead
specifics regarding the “time, place, persons, and fraudulent nature of the
alleged acts.”61 These requirements translate into courts requiring the
relator to provide detailed and specific claims for payment in the initial
pleading.62
III. THE APPLICATION OF RULE 9(B) TO THE QUI TAM ACTION AND ITS
DISASTROUS RESULTS
When the courts require a relator to identify specific invoices or bills,63
they limit the government’s ability to utilize the False Claims Act.64 By
dismissing cases that present valid violations of the FCA, the courts thwart
the purpose of the FCA and devalue the necessity of private citizens
bringing qui tam actions.
A definitive illustration of Rule 9(b) undermining the FCA is the First
Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in United States ex rel. Karvelas v.

60. United States ex rel. Aflatooni v. Kitsap Physician Serv., 314 F.3d 995, 1000 (9th
Cir. 2002); United States ex rel. Darrig v. Med. Consultants Network, Inc., No. 04-650-HA,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80789, at *5-6 (D. Or. Nov. 2, 2006), rev’d and remanded, 303 F.
App’x 429 (9th Cir. 2008); United States ex rel. Stewart v. La. Clinic, No. 99-1767, 2003
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9401, at *28 (E.D. La. June 4, 2003).
61. BOESE, supra note 54, § 5.04, at 5-49.
62. Courts vary in what details they require. These details range from contract
information, patient names, physician names, identification numbers, dates, times, amounts,
billing cycles, and any other minutiae that results in disallowing a relator from bringing a qui
tam action under the FCA. However, the Fifth Circuit recently acknowledged the
impropriety of courts requiring detail that would carry the burden of proof in the relator’s
complaint:
Nevertheless, a plaintiff does not necessarily need the exact dollar amounts,
billing numbers, or dates to prove to a preponderance that fraudulent bills were
actually submitted. To require these details at pleading is one small step shy of
requiring production of actual documentation with the complaint, a level of
proof not demanded to win at trial and significantly more than any federal
pleading rule contemplates.
United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180, 190 (5th Cir. 2009).
63. In other words, a specific claim.
64. SYLVIA, supra note 23, at 537. By disallowing valid qui tam complaints because of a
procedural dissection, the government will lose the valuable assistance of relators
contemplated and intended under the FCA. “The Act is designed to encourage private
individuals to report and pursue allegations of fraud against the Government. Because these
private individuals are ordinarily not parties to the relevant transaction with the Government,
they may be unaware of some of the details of the alleged false or fraudulent conduct.” Id.
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Melrose-Wakefield Hospital.65 In 2004, the First Circuit improperly applied
Rule 9(b), affirming the district court’s dismissal66 of a qui tam action that
outlined numerous fraudulent schemes.67 In Karvelas, the relator was
employed at the defendant hospital for fifteen years. He claimed that the
hospital “falsely certified” that it was in compliance with Medicare
standards for three years.68 By making these false certifications, the relator
alleged that the hospital “wrongfully billed Medicare and/or Medicaid,
presumably on the basis of services that were being provided improperly or
not at all.”69
In his complaint, the relator made detailed allegations about thirteen
fraudulent schemes the defendants were committing against the
government. Not only did he have direct knowledge of the false claims
submitted,70 but he also clearly described the billing of twelve respiratory
therapists when the hospital only employed seven;71 that the hospital did not
use appropriate testing machinery, which was required for federal
reimbursement;72 and that the defendants had filed improper claims because
they knew the bills were for unnecessary medical treatment.73 The District
65. United States ex rel. Karvelas v. Melrose-Wakefield Hosp., 360 F.3d 220 (1st Cir.
2004).
66. United States ex rel. Karvelas v. Melrose-Wakefield Hosp., No. 01-10583-DPW,
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8846 (D. Mass. 2003).
67. Karvelas, 360 F.3d at 221.
68. Id. at 223.
69. Id.
70. Karvelas, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8846, at *15 (“He states that he witnessed the
fraudulent conduct alleged herein, but does not provide specifics regarding the documents
submitted to HCFA to make the false claims.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
71. Id.
In the complaint, Karvelas states that the documents signed under the penalty
of perjury and false statement submitted to the United States Government
certified that there were 11.8 Respiratory Therapists, but does not provide any
further detail regarding what type of document it was, when it was submitted,
or by whom it was submitted.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
72. Id. at *18.
The hospital performed blood tests with machinery and equipment that was not
tested, or up to code, or certified, and did not meet the standards accepted by
the medical community, which were not in compliance with the Clinical
Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988 nor had certification from the
College of American Pathologists, which Karvelas alleges are required to
receive payment under Medicaid and Medicare.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
73. Id. at *19-20 (“In contravention of Medicare and Medicaid provisions, which
require that services be certified as being medically necessary, the defendants knowingly
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Court dismissed the complaint despite the relator’s firsthand knowledge and
his dialogue with the defendants about the fraudulent schemes, because he
failed to identify a specific invoice, bill, or claim for payment in his
complaint.74
The First Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint with prejudice.
The appellate court declared that the complaint was merely attempting to
mine discovery, and that the ninety-three-page complaint, even read in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, could not present a viable claim.75
Despite the relator alleging that he had incriminating documents76 and
identifying some physicians by name,77 the court stated that:
details concerning the dates of the claims, the content of the
forms or bills submitted, their identification numbers, the amount
of money charged to the government, the particular goods or
services for which the government was billed, the individuals
involved in the billing, and the length of time between the
alleged fraudulent practices and the submission of claims based
on those practices are the types of information that may help a
relator to state his or her claims with particularity.78
The court determined that the complaint failed to satisfy Rule 9(b)79
because the relator did not plead a specific date, exact claim for payment,
specific identification numbers, individuals involved in improper billing,80

filed improper claims in that they presented claims for medical items or service that they
knew were not medically necessary.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
74. The court also determined that the documents were not solely in the defendant’s
possession, and therefore Karvelas could not attempt to rely on a theory that he did not have
access to the actual claims. Id. at *29.
75. United States ex rel. Karvelas v. Melrose-Wakefield Hosp., 360 F.3d 220, 231 (1st
Cir. 2004).
76. Karvelas, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8846, at *18 (“Karvelas also states that he is in
possession of time sheets that reflect the staffing issues dating from 1996-97 but has not
provided this documentation.”).
77. Id. at *24 (“He alleges that the defendant hospital steered and channeled patients to
a home health company in which it had an interest. He also alleges that Dr. Sen, Dr.
Mohammed Akabarian, Dr. Michael Zak, and other hospital staff engaged in ‘self-referrals’
and ‘conflicts of interest’ . . . .” (citation omitted)).
78. Karvelas, 360 F.3d at 233.
79. Id. at 235. “As the district court correctly concluded, Karvelas’s failure to identify
with particularity any actual false claims that the defendants submitted to the government is,
ultimately, fatal to his complaint.” Id.
80. The court failed to recognize that Karvelas did name physicians. Karvelas, 2003
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8846, at *24.
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or the source of information for his allegations.81 The complaint was
dismissed despite the relator’s clear and detailed identification of ongoing
fraudulent schemes.
This First Circuit case does not stand alone in its improper application of
Rule 9(b). The Fifth Circuit also relied on fundamentally flawed analysis in
dismissing the relator’s complaint in United States ex rel. Russell v. Epic
Healthcare Management Group.82 In Russell, the relator brought an action
alleging that her employer was charging Medicare for services that were
never rendered.83 The relator’s complaint described the time period during
which the scheme occurred, the names of patients who were ineligible to be
charging Medicare, and the fact that the defendant had instructed the
workers to “generate regular records for [the defendant’s] ineligible
Medicare-patients even thought [sic] they did not qualify for medicare [sic]
services.”84 In her complaint, Russell alleged personally witnessing
inaccurate billing.85
Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit determined that the complaint did not
satisfy Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement and dismissed the claim. In a
cursory discussion, the court held that in order to satisfy Rule 9, a relator
must plead a specific “claim” presented to the government: “Because such
statements or claims are among the circumstances constituting fraud in a
False Claims Act suit, these must be pled with particularity under Rule
9(b).”86 Ignoring the specificity of the allegations that would direct the
81. Id. at *2-3. Sadly, the relator made it clear that he knew of the schemes first hand,
and the district court even laid out the circumstances in its opinion:
Karvelas alleges that, on September 9, 1996, he notified the Vice President of
Human Resources, Richard Kenny, that the hospital should take corrective
action regarding defective arterial blood gas (ABG) testing machinery, about
understaffing and patient neglect. Karvelas also claims he informed Kenny his
supervisors had destroyed incident reports regarding medical errors. He
complained to Kenny that he had been directed by his supervisor to complete
patient evaluations, which were improperly billed to Medicare and Medicaid,
and had been threatened with retaliation if they failed to participate in this
illegal activity.
Id. (citations, internal quotation marks, and footnotes omitted).
82. United States ex rel. Russell v. Epic Healthcare Mgmt. Group, 193 F.3d 304 (5th
Cir. 1999). Due to the Fifth Circuit’s cursory disposal of the relator’s claim, the facts must
be derived from the briefs provided in the case.
83. Brief of Appellants at 5, 6, United States ex rel. Russell v. Epic Healthcare Mgmt.
Group, 193 F.3d 304 (5th Cir. 1999) (No. 98-20743), 1998 WL 34085825.
84. Id. at 11.
85. Brief of Appellees at 4, United States ex rel. Russell v. Epic Healthcare Mgmt.
Group, 193 F.3d 304 (5th Cir. 1999) (No. 98-20743), 1999 WL 33613046.
86. Russell, 193 F.3d at 308.
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defendant to the fraudulent scheme and the eyewitness account of the
relator, the court refused to “relax” the pleading standard.87
These two cases are merely representative samples of many such
decisions where the relator provides more than sufficient notice and detail
concerning the nature of the allegations, sufficient reliability, and a
firsthand view of the fraudulent scheme that exploited the federal
government. Yet the courts continue to insist on a rigid application of Rule
9(b) to the claim for payment itself. The complaints being dismissed are not
situations of mere speculation or information and belief. Some of the
relators that are dismissed are employed in the very department carrying out
the fraudulent scheme, with firsthand knowledge of exactly how the scheme
works, describing the particular actors and the actual instructions that create
the scheme to cheat the government—in other words, the ideal relator under
the FCA. The only missing piece is what particular invoices contained the
payments of a false claim, so the courts determine that Rule 9(b) need only
be applied to the claim-for-payment aspect of the FCA action.
Such cases provide a perfect snapshot of the dangers of improperly
applying Rule 9(b), and the government and taxpayers are suffering through
this misapplication. For instance, if the First Circuit had appropriately
allowed the relator to plead the fraudulent schemes with particularity,88 then
Karvelas would have been allowed to continue in his case and assist the
government in recovering millions of dollars obtained through fraudulent
devices. The defendant would not be compromised, because when provided
with such particular detail of the scheme, the defendant is put on sufficient
notice to prepare a response and will be able to cite to the invoices from its
own files.
IV. JUDICIAL RELAXATION OF RULE 9(B): AN ATTEMPT TO
QUALIFY THE MISAPPLICATION
Although courts have labored under the rigid belief that the “claim”
element(s) of a qui tam complaint must be pled with particularity, many
courts have carved exceptions for some relators’ complaints. These
exceptions normally fall into one of two categories: (1) where the complaint

87. Id. at 308-09.
88. That is, describing the procedures that were in violation of the federal requirements,
the years in which the scheme occurred, the general overarching plan, and, if applicable, the
people with whom the relator spoke about the scheme yet was denied any remedy. In
essence, pleading the third prong of an FCA qui tam action: knowing of the falsity. See supra
notes 65-74 and accompanying text.
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possesses appropriate indicia of reliability,89 or (2) when the evidence is
exclusively within the defendant’s control.90
A. A Complaint’s Indicia of Reliability
If a complaint carries sufficient “indicia of reliability” on its face, some
courts91 will not dismiss the complaint despite the fact that it lacks a
specific claim for payment being pled.92 The indicia of reliability
determination usually relies on the relator being an insider and working in
the billing or accounting department of the defendant.93 This concept of a
minor relaxation from demanding a specific invoice finds its roots in the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals with its decision in United States ex rel.
Clausen v. Laboratory Corp. of America, Inc.94 Just as Karvelas is a lasting
testament to the misapplication of Rule 9(b), Clausen is a decision
demonstrating the disaster of strict application of Rule 9(b) to the claim
element, dismissing a strong complaint on the erroneous analysis that it did
not satisfy the strictures of Rule 9(b). Nevertheless, the Clausen decision is
the source of “indicia of reliability.”
1. Indicia of Reliability: Roots in Misapplication
In United States ex rel. Clausen v. Laboratory Corp. of America, Inc.,
Clausen filed a qui tam action naming one of his employer’s competitors as
defendant; the complaint alleged over a decade of fraudulent billing
practices in the defendant’s testing services.95 After the relator amended his

89. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Kennedy v. Aventis Pharms., Inc., 512 F. Supp. 2d
1158 (N.D. Ill. 2007); cf. Corsello v. Lincare, Inc., 428 F.3d 1008 (11th Cir. 2005)
(affirming dismissal of complaint).
90. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Willard v. Humana Health Plan of Tex., Inc., 336
F.3d 375, 385 (5th Cir. 2003).
91. See, e.g., United States v. Gwinn, No. 5:06-cv-00267, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26361
(S.D.W. Va. Mar. 31, 2008) (determining that even though the action was not a qui tam filed
by a relator, the indicia of reliability standard could still be applied); cf. United States ex rel.
Nichols v. Omni H.C., Inc., No. 4:02-cv-66(HL), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25441 (M.D. Ga.
Mar. 31, 2008) (dismissing complaint); United States ex rel. Digiovanni v. St.
Joseph’s/Candler Health Sys., Inc., No. CV404-190, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9935 (S.D. Ga.
Feb. 8, 2008) (same).
92. See United States ex rel. Walker v. R&F Properties of Lake County, Inc., 433 F.3d
1349 (11th Cir. 2005).
93. See United States ex rel. Atkins v. McInteer, 470 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 2006).
94. United States ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., Inc., 290 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir.
2002).
95. Id. at 1303.
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complaint twice, the complaint was dismissed, with the dismissal affirmed
by the appellate court.96 Clausen provided detailed information about
conversations with employees, descriptions and codes for medical tests that
represented the false claims, and three patient histories.97 In his second
amended complaint, Clausen even provided “a table of medical test codes,”
model forms that would have been presented to the government as a bill,
descriptions of how the testing would be identified, and the identification of
patient lists and code charts that would reveal the false claims filed with the
government.98 Clausen even identified the day the service was rendered.
However, the defendant persisted in moving for dismissal because Clausen
did not identify a specific false claim that was submitted to the
government.99
The essence of his allegations is that between the late 1980s and 1998 LabCorp
performed unauthorized, unnecessary or excessive medical tests on LTCF
residents who participated in Government-funded health insurance programs
and then knowingly submitted bills for this work to agents of the Government,
requesting taxpayer funds to which it was not entitled. Clausen also alleges that
although LabCorp was entitled to receive payments for some work related to its
testing services, such as blood draws and transportation costs, it overbilled for
those services during this time period as a result of the improper tests it
performed.
Id.
96. Id. at 1315.
97. Id. at 1304.
98. Id. at 1306.
The Second Amended Complaint suggested one can understand many details
about the alleged false claims by (1) looking at one of the three LTCF patient
lists identifying what tests each patient was receiving, (2) obtaining the
appropriate codes for those tests from the medical test code chart, and (3)
turning to the blank Form 1500 to see how LabCorp would have filled out a
claim for each individual with this information.
Id.
99. Id. at 1307.
[T]he district court concluded that Clausen’s revised pleading suffers from the
same defect as the [First] Amended Complaint in that it did not identif[y] a
single fraudulent claim by date filed, amount or claim number that was actually
submitted to the government. The district court pointed out that [i]dentifying
the type of claim form used and stating that a claim was filed on the day of
service or a few days thereafter is not sufficient to identify the fraud claims
with sufficient particularity to comply with Rule 9(b) in the context of this
case. Continuing to enforce the dictates of Rule 9(b), the district court added
that [t]he particularity requirement of Rule 9 is a nullity if Plaintiff gets a ticket
to the discovery process without identifying a single false claim by amount.
Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The appellate court agreed, again stating that the complaint’s “fatal flaw”
was having no specific false claim identified. In making this decision, the
court stated:
Rule 9(b)’s directive that “the circumstances constituting fraud
or mistake shall be stated with particularity” does not permit a
False Claims Act plaintiff merely to describe a private scheme in
detail but then to allege simply and without any stated reason for
his belief that claims requesting illegal payments must have been
submitted, were likely submitted or should have been submitted
to the Government. . . . [I]f Rule 9(b) is to be adhered to, some
indicia of reliability must be given in the complaint to support
the allegation of an actual false claim for payment being made to
the Government.100
The court proceeded to find that since Clausen was a corporate
“outsider,”101 his complaint demonstrated no indicia of reliability and
therefore must fail since he did not plead any individual false claims.102 The

100. Id. at 1311 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
101. Clausen filed a suit against a competitor; the court did not elaborate on whether
Clausen’s complaint would have passed muster if he was an “insider.” See id. at 1314.
102. Id. at 1315. While “indicia of reliability” was merely mentioned in passing in
Clausen, it has developed into a test on its own to determine whether the complaint satisfies
Rule 9(b) or not. This is a good development for qui tam complaints and the private citizens
who bring these actions, but defendants see it from another side:
The “indicia of reliability” test has, unfortunately, developed from a minor
factor in Clausen to a deciding factor . . . . This development is contrary to the
language and intent of Rule 9(b), as well as established authority in other
circuits. Rule 9(b) is an unequivocal pleading requirement: it sets forth what
“particulars” must be included on the fact of the complaint. Indeed, Rule 9(a)
specifically states that it “is not necessary to aver the capacity of the party to
sue” unless “necessary to show the jurisdiction of the court.” By relying so
heavily on the capacity of the party, the prior job descriptions, roles or
knowledge of the party, the Eleventh Circuit is effectively relaxing the Rule
9(b) pleading requirements whenever relators aver that their insider status
provides an “indicia of reliability” to unacceptably vague pleadings.
BOESE, supra note 54, § 5.04(b), at 5-62.5. Boese fails to recognize the purposes behind the
FCA and the purposes of the Rule 9 requirements in the first place: providing the defendant
with notice in order to prepare a defense. When a relator has laid out a specific allegation of
a long-term fraudulent scheme, the defendant will be more than able to mount a defense. The
defendant, or anyone in the qui tam action, will know exactly what is being alleged against
it.
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Eleventh Circuit would soon take the indicia of reliability evaluation and
make it a deciding factor in ruling on a Rule 9(b) motion.103
2. The Eleventh Circuit: Closer to the Goal, yet Still Falling Short
The Eleventh Circuit proceeded to apply the indicia of reliability
evaluation in United States ex rel. Walker104 and the unpublished Hill v.
Morehouse Medical Associates decision.105
In Walker, the appellate court evaluated a nurse practitioner’s allegation
that the hospital submitted false claims to Medicare, billing for services
rendered by a physician when the services were actually performed by a
nurse or a physician assistant.106 The District Court denied the defendant’s
motion to dismiss under Rule 9(b), and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.107
Distinguishing the Clausen case from the case then at hand, the appellate
court determined that since the relator was a nurse practitioner, had billed
as a physician, and had entered into personal discussions regarding the
billing procedure, the relator had alleged sufficient facts to put the
defendant on notice of the allegations against it.108 Even though the court
was hesitant because the relator never pointed to a specific claim for
payment in her complaint, it allowed the case to move forward.
Though a step in the right direction, the Eleventh Circuit’s decision still
does not satisfy the purposes of the FCA. While the court’s ultimate
decision to allow the relator’s case to go forward was correct, the decision
failed to reach the heart of the issue; the Eleventh Circuit still demands that
a specific claim for payment be pled. In Walker,109 the relator actually
participated in the false billing. The so-called relaxation that took place
does not protect a relator employee who was not directly involved in the
103. Not only did Clausen appropriately plead a fraudulent scheme, but he also offered
specific details on the who, what, where, when, and how that should have satisfied Rule 9(b)
analysis. In other words, he sufficiently pled that the defendant had knowledge of the claim’s
falsity. See Clausen, 290 F.3d at 1304-06.
104. United States ex rel. Walker v. R&F Properties of Lake County, Inc., 433 F.3d 1349
(11th Cir. 2005).
105. Hill v. Morehouse Med. Assocs., No. 02-14429, 2003 WL 22019936 (11th Cir.
Aug. 15, 2003). Under the Eleventh Circuit rules of procedure, unpublished opinions “are
not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.” 11th Cir.
R. 36-2. Though unpublished, the Hill decision carries persuasive weight and was followed
in the Northern District of Alabama. United States ex rel. Brunson v. Narrows Health &
Wellness L.L.C., 469 F. Supp. 2d 1048 (N.D. Ala. 2006).
106. Walker, 433 F.3d at 1353.
107. Id. at 1360.
108. Id.
109. See discussion infra Part IV.A.2.
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false billing. The Eleventh Circuit properly allowed the relator to move
forward because her complaint had sufficient indicia of reliability.110
However, due to the focus on the claim element of the action, if she had not
been the nurse who actually made incorrect bills, she would have been
dismissed for not identifying a specific bill or invoice.111
The Eleventh Circuit continued to apply the idea of indicia of reliability
in the unpublished Hill opinion, where it held that the relator’s complaint
met the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b).112 Hill worked as a coder
and biller for the defendant, and she alleged that the defendant instituted a
scheme of submitting claims for work that was never performed. Hill
amended her complaint to include the coding process, the forms, and details
about “five fraudulent billing schemes, who engaged in them, and the
frequency of the schemes.”113 Hill saw dozens of claims filed but did not
identify any specific patients, dates, or any actual claims submitted to the
government.114
Due to the lack of claim for payment in the pleading, the district court
dismissed her complaint, but the Eleventh Circuit stated that proper indicia
of reliability would save a relator’s complaint.115 In this case, Hill was
employed “in the very department where she alleged the fraudulent billing
schemes occurred,” “had firsthand information” about the billing, pointed
110. For a critique against the use of the indicia of reliability test, see BOESE, supra note
54, § 5.04(b), at 5-57–5-58.
111. Walker, 433 F.3d at 1360.
Walker’s complaint identifies her as a nurse practitioner who was employed at
LFM. Walker alleges that, during her employment at LFM, she never had her
own UPIN and that she was instructed each day which doctor she would be
billing under. The Amended Complaint also alleges that Walker had at least
one personal discussion with LFM’s office administrator (identified in the
complaint by name) during which the two women discussed that Walker did
not have her own UPIN, whether Walker and the other nurse practitioners and
physician assistants should have their own UPINs, that (according to the office
administrator) LFM billed all nurse practitioner and physician assistant services
as rendered incident to the service of a physician, that . . . LFM had never billed
nurse practitioner or physician assistant services in another manner, and the
propriety of the billing method.
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
112. Hill v. Morehouse Med. Assocs., No. 02-14429, 2003 WL 22019936, at *5 (11th
Cir. Aug. 15, 2003).
113. Id. at *1.
114. Id. at *2.
115. Even though unpublished, Hill was followed in United States ex rel. Brunson v.
Narrows Health & Wellness LLC, 469 F. Supp. 2d 1048 (N.D. Ala. 2006) (holding the
relator’s complaint satisfied Rule 9(b)).
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to documents in the defendant’s possession, and knew the specific codes
that were upcoded.116
Although positive at first blush, Hill and its application of Rule 9(b)
contain the same deficiencies as Walker. Though taking a step forward and
not forcing a relator to plead a specific bill, invoice, or claim, both
decisions still force the relator to actually participate in the billing and
submission of claims. Thus, the indicia of reliability “relaxation,” while
moving in the right direction, refuses to address the problem: the court is
perpetuating a rigid application of Rule 9(b) to the claim-for-payment
element of the FCA action.
3. The Eighth Circuit: Dismissing Relators’ Claims Despite Their
Indicia of Reliability
The Eighth Circuit profoundly demonstrates the deficiency in seeking
specific indicia of reliability in lieu of a distinct claim.117 In United States
ex rel. Joshi v. St. Luke’s Hospital, Inc.,118 the relator was an
anesthesiologist who administered anesthesia at the defendant hospital for
seven years.119 In his complaint, Dr. Joshi alleged that the defendants
received Medicare reimbursement for services being performed by a doctor
when a doctor actually had not directed or supervised the work,120 that the
defendants would bill Medicare for entire boxes of supplies or prescriptions
rather than the amount actually used,121 and that the defendant participated
in a conspiracy in violation of the FCA.122
In his first complaint, the relator merely alleged, “St. Luke’s had all the
work done by the CRNAs and Dr. Bashiti assigned to itself, and the
medical bills to the government sufficiently identify the time, place, and
content of the fraudulent representations.”123 After he received leave to
amend, the relator added a table that identified the anesthesia services
provided, the time, the surgeon, the patient initials, the CRNA who
performed the services, and a table that summarized, based on information
116. Hill, 2003 WL 22019936, at *4.
117. Ironically, a leading author believes the indicia of reliability test is harming the
defendants in an FCA action brought by a relator. See generally BOESE, supra note 54.
118. United States ex rel. Joshi v. Saint Luke’s Hosp., Inc., 441 F.3d 552 (8th Cir. 2006).
119. Id. at 553.
120. Id. “Dr. Joshi alleges that Dr. Bashiti failed both to perform pre-anesthetic
evaluations and prescribe anesthesia plans, and Dr. Bashiti falsely certified he supervised or
directed the work of several certified registered nurse anesthetists.” Id.
121. Id. at 554.
122. Id.
123. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

358

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:337

and belief, the medications that were issued to patients and improperly
billed in 1995.124
The Eighth Circuit, even though touting that it would evaluate indicia of
reliability, still dismissed the complaint. Despite the relator clearly
describing specific instances of false billing,125 the Eighth Circuit found it
appropriate to dismiss Dr. Joshi’s complaint because he did not sufficiently
plead the “‘who, what, where, when, and how’ of the alleged fraud.”126 In
other words, he did not identify a specific claim for payment.127
The only difference between Dr. Joshi and his relator counterparts in the
Eleventh Circuit cases of Walker and Hill is that he was not actually
participating in the false billing. He was merely an anesthesiologist who
worked with the individuals committing the false billing for seven years.128
Such a dismissal undermines the FCA. Despite the relator providing a
chart with intricate details,129 the court still determined that, under the
misapplied particularity standard of Rule 9(b), the relator could not satisfy
the heavy pleading burden because he provided no claim numbers.130
Joshi is a capstone demonstrating that even though a court may speak in
terms of indicia of reliability, the continual focus on pleading a specific bill
or invoice is an improper application of the Rule. Rule 9 is satisfied when a
complaint, such as the relator’s in Joshi, sufficiently and with particularity
lays out the who, what, where, when, and how of a fraudulent scheme. Still,
the complaint fails under the courts’ current misapplications in the qui tam
context.

124. Id. at 555.
125. Dr. Joshi was an anesthetist, the origination of the false claims alleged against the
hospital and Dr. Bashiti. After spending seven years working with the doctor and the system
of the hospital, it is difficult to conceive of someone who could provide more sufficient
indicia of reliability. See generally id.
126. Joshi, 441 F.3d at 556 (quoting United States ex rel. Costner v. URS Consultants,
Inc., 317 F.3d 883, 888 (8th Cir. 2001)).
127. Any individual reading the opinion can see that he actually did answer all five of the
journalistic questions—but not in the form of a specific claim.
128. Joshi, 441 F.3d at 557.
129. Including the initials of the patients that were served on the bill sent to Medicare. Id.
at 555.
130. Again, when a Rule 9(b) motion is brought forward, the court is to assume all facts
alleged in the complaint are true. A motion to dismissed is disfavored. See supra note 9.
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B. Another Attempt at Misapplication: When the Information Is
Exclusively in the Defendant’s Control
While some courts attempted to implement the indicia of reliability as
some relaxation in applying Rule 9(b) in the qui tam context, a few courts
have attempted to relax current Rule 9(b) strictures when the information
about specific claims made to the government is exclusively in the
defendant’s control.131
Because a relator is not the harmed party in a qui tam action, the relator
does not have access to the actual documentation of the false claims.132 In a
typical court case, the person filing the action is the injured party and has
possession of the incriminating documents. However, a qui tam plaintiff
stands in the place of the federal government, the real party in interest.
Therefore, the main obstacles to pleading fraud with particularity manifest
themselves when the government chooses not to intervene133 in the relator’s
action.134 Thus, a relator does not have access to the needed documents and
has no access to the necessary detail to identify specific claims being
submitted to the government. A relator may not have been employed in the
defendant’s billing department or copied documents before leaving his job.
131. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Willard v. Humana Health Plan of Tex., Inc., 336
F.3d 375, 385 (5th Cir. 2003) (“It is true that the pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) may be
to some extent relaxed where . . . the facts relating to the alleged fraud are peculiarly within
the perpetrator’s knowledge.”). This rule has also been applied in other fraud or fraud-based
claims: “We have noted on a number of occasions that the particularity requirement of Rule
9(b) must be relaxed where the plaintiff lacks access to all facts necessary to detail his claim,
and that is most likely to be the case where, as here, the plaintiff alleges a fraud against one
or more third parties.” Corley v. Rosewood Care Center, Inc., 142 F.3d 1041, 1051 (7th Cir.
1998).
132. In 2009, the Seventh Circuit put a spin on this exception in United States ex rel.
Lusby v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 570 F.3d 849, 854 (7th Cir. 2009). The relator did not have
access to the actual invoices or contracts, but alleged specific parts that violated the
government contracts. Rather than adopting the defendant’s theory regarding Rule 9(b), the
court stated that the relator did not have access to the paperwork to make the specified
allegations, so as long as there was enough information in the complaint for the court to
make an inference of fraud, the complaint passed muster. Id. Assumedly, the relaxation was
due to the fact that he did not have access to the incriminating documents.
133. When the government chooses not to intervene in the case pursuant to 31 U.S.C. §
3730(b)(4)(B), the relator may choose to continue in prosecuting the action on the
government’s behalf under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3). Even if the government initially chooses
not to intervene in the action, it may still do so later on in the proceeding, at the
government’s sole discretion. When the government exercises this choice to not intervene
the relator has the most problems with satisfying Rule 9(b).
134. Anna Mae Walsh Burke, Qui Tam: Blowing the Whistle for Uncle Sam, 21 NOVA L.
REV. 869, 899 (1997) (stating that a relator could plead actual invoices, amounts, and
purchase agreements only when the government intervenes in the case).
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The defendant then is in exclusive control of the necessary documentation
displaying a specific invoice or bill.135
Therefore, since the relator may not have access to the exact claim
numbers or documents, when the evidence is in the defendant’s control, a
relator may not have to identify a specific claim.136 While a relator is still
held to Rule 9(b) particularity and obligated to plead the “time, place, and
contents of the false representations, as well as the identity of the person
making the misrepresentation and what that person obtained thereby,”137
there is a chance that the relator may not have to identify a specific claim.
1. Application of “Defendant’s Control”: Still Focused on a Specific
Claim
The Northern District of Illinois aptly evaluated a complaint when the
information was exclusively in the defendant’s control in United States ex
rel. Yannacopolous v. Lockheed Martin Corp.138 In Yannacopolous, the
relator was a consultant who worked on a contract selling American
military equipment to the Greek government.139 Lockheed Martin140 was
awarded the lucrative contract to sell F-16s to the Greeks.141 The relator
brought a seven-count complaint, alleging the defendants engaged in
numerous schemes: (1) submitting false statements for the F-16 airframe,
(2) submitting false records in relation to maintenance, (3) submitting false
statements about the production of the goods, (4) submitting false claims
for work never actually performed, (5) submitting claims to collect in
excess of what they were entitled to, (6) failing to disclose a price
135. Some courts have determined in similar situations that it is appropriate not to
dismiss a relator’s complaint. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Downy v. Corning, Inc., 118 F.
Supp. 2d 1160 (D.N.M. 2000).
136. Unlike an average fraud case, a relator is not in possession of the necessary
information to sufficiently fulfill all of the requisite elements of the violation—e.g., identity
of a specific claim, names and dates of the people who are participating in the fraud, etc.
Typically, the defendant is the only party who knows this information, and the defendant is
the party who knows it the best, so the courts should not waste precious time worrying that
the defendant will not be aware of the conduct for which it is accused. HELMER, supra note
9, at 357.
137. Williams v. WMX Tech., Inc., 112 F.3d 175, 177 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Tuchman
v. DSC Commc’n Corp., 14 F.3d 1061, 1068 (5th Cir. 1994).
138. United States ex rel. Yannacopolous v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 315 F. Supp. 2d 939
(N.D. Ill. 2004).
139. Id. at 941.
140. Lockheed was the successor company that took over the contract negotiations and
sales.
141. Yannacopolous, 315 F. Supp. 2d at 943.
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adjustment, and (7) modifying a contract to overcharge the government by
over $29 million.142
The relator did not identify any specific invoices in his complaint,
garnering a motion for dismissal for failing to plead fraud with particularity.
The defendant claimed that the relator failed to allege the who, what, when,
and where of the fraudulent scheme.143 The court disagreed. “Those details .
. . are in the exclusive possession of defendants, and relator need not allege
them under Rule 9(b).”144 The relator was thus allowed to continue in his
quest to recover money paid out by the government due to false claims. The
relator appropriately cited “what the defendants did to defraud the United
States,” and pled “specific timeframes”; demanding greater specificity of
“where” would undermine the purpose of notice pleading under Rule 8.145
Further, the relator had no access to this information, and since that was the
case, demanding more specificity would not be feasible.146
Since the relator was able to sufficiently apprise the defendant of the
situation for which it was being sued, it was appropriate to allow the
complaint to move forward. Yannacopolous did not have access to the
defendant’s records and thus was incapable of identifying a specific claim
for payment. If he had been required to plead a specific claim, his
complaint would have been dismissed with no opportunity to exercise the
qui tam right granted to him under the FCA. Nevertheless, the court still
erroneously focused on the claim element of the action, rather than
acknowledging that the fraudulent scheme was pled with particularity.
Another District Court applied the relaxed standard of “in the
defendant’s control” to the pleading in United States ex rel. Downy v.
Corning, Inc.147 The relator in Downy offered a complaint that sufficiently
alleged an overall fraudulent scheme of over-reporting to Medicare in order
to receive more money, but did not specify any specific false claim for
payment.148 However, she did identify the time period, the defendants, and
the alleged wrongdoing. In response to a motion to dismiss under Rule 9(b)
because the relator did not specify any false claims, the court stated, “The
Court notes some form of limited discovery would probably be necessary to
allow Relator to provide such specific examples, if they exist, since
information concerning the physicians who requested PSA/PAP tests from
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 944.
Id. at 945-46.
Id. at 945.
Id. at 945-46 (citations omitted).
Id.
United States ex rel. Downy v. Corning, Inc., 118 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (D.N.M. 2000).
Id. at 1172.
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Defendants’ laboratories is undoubtedly in Defendants’ possession rather
than the public domain.”149 Therefore, the motion for dismissal was denied
because the relator had no access to the documentation that was exclusively
in the defendant’s control.
Yannacopolous and Downy, while allowing the relators to move forward
with their complaints, still erroneously focused on the pleading of a claim
itself, rather than the defendant’s comprehension of falsity and the
fraudulent scheme. In any event, some courts do not acknowledge any
relaxation if the relator has no access to the documents,150 and even courts
that do proclaim a relaxed standard still dismiss otherwise adequate qui tam
complaints.
2. Relators Still Slip Through the Cracks of Dismissal Under the “In
the Defendant’s Control” Theory
Even those circuits that acknowledge the inadequacy of forcing a relator
to identify specific claims fail to properly apply Rule 9(b). For example, the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has applied an exception when “the
facts relating to the alleged fraud are peculiarly within the defendant’s
knowledge.”151 Nevertheless, the court determined that the exception “must
not be mistaken for a license to base claims of fraud on speculation and
conclusory allegations.”152 This translates into dismissing complaints when
they do not identify a specific invoice or bill, whether or not the relator has
access to the information.
The Fifth Circuit fell into this trap in an unpublished opinion in 2005.153
In Sealed Appellant I, the relator laid out a fraudulent scheme in which the
defendant allegedly failed to satisfy requirements for ambulance runs to be
reimbursed by Medicare.154 The appellant was a former Director of
Compliance for the appellee and had been fired before he could collect his
personal effects and documents that would have supported his qui tam
claim.155
149. Id. at 1173.
150. See, e.g., Corsello v. Lincare, Inc. 428 F.3d 1008 (11th Cir. 2005).
151. United States ex rel. Sandra Russell v. Epic Healthcare Mgmt. Group, 193 F.3d 304,
308 (5th Cir. 1999).
152. United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia Healthcare Corp., 125 F.3d 899, 903
(5th Cir. 1997).
153. Sealed Appellant I v. Sealed Appellee I, 156 F. App’x 630 (5th Cir. 2005).
154. Id. at 631.
155. Id. at 632. The Appellant also brought a claim for wrongful discharge under 31
U.S.C. § 3730(h), which provides in relevant part:
Any employee, contractor, or agent shall be entitled to all relief necessary to
make that employee, contractor, or agent whole, if that employee, contractor, or
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The appellant’s complaint was dismissed even though he discussed the
training sessions for the billing clerks, his experience as a Director of
Compliance, and a supervisor’s specific instructions.156 The appellant
attempted to convince the court that he was entitled to a relaxed pleading
standard because the information necessary to plead a specific false claim
was in the appellee’s possession. However, the court curtly dismissed this
plea, stating that the appellant had not shown any effort to obtain the
information from any other source and therefore, was not entitled to a
relaxed pleading standard.157 “[N]othing prevented Appellant from
contacting Appellee’s employees on his own, whether before commencing
the litigation or after. Accordingly, the district court properly granted
Appellee’s motion to dismiss Appellant’s claim for violation of the FCA for
failure to plead with particularity and failure to state a claim.”158
This result is inexplicable. The court’s expectation that the defendant
would simply give the relator the false claims is incomprehensible. The
court states that there is a relaxed pleading standard when the information is
exclusively in the hands of the defendant or the government, and then it
dismisses the claim because the relator “could” go to the defendant and ask
for the incriminating documents, which is likely an exercise in futility.
Even though he was fired before he could return to his office even to collect
his personal property,159 the court determined that “it defied credulity that
he is unable to identify any details of a single false claim submitted to the
government.”160 However, the court’s decision itself defies credulity and is
a vivid example of the misapplication of Rule 9(b) and any so-called
“relaxed” standard under the current regime of pleading.161
agent is discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed, or in any other
manner discriminated against in the terms and conditions of employment because
of lawful acts done by the employee, contractor, or agent on behalf of the
employee, contractor, or agent or associated others in furtherance of other efforts
to stop 1 or more violations of this subchapter.
31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(1) (2006 & Supp. 2009).
156. Id. at 631-32.
157. Id. at 634.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 632 (“Appellant was unable to retrieve from his office his personal effects or
documentation that supported his allegations.”).
160. Id. at 634.
161. The Fifth Circuit also falls into this trap. While admitting that a relator may plead
with a relaxed specificity when the information is in the defendant’s control, it still keeps
restrictions on the relators. United States ex rel. Willard v. Humana Health Plan of Tex. Inc.,
336 F.3d 375, 385 (5th Cir. 2003). While Willard’s one-sentence allegation would not have
been sufficient under any standard, the court’s flippant dismissal due to the relator not
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3. The First Circuit Ignores Its Own Precedent of a “Relaxed”
Standard
In 2007, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
demonstrated the fact that even when applying a “relaxed” standard to the
pleading of a specific claim in the complaint, demanding a specific invoice
or bill undermines the qui tam provision in the FCA.162 Prior to the Rost
case, the First Circuit had clearly stated in Karvelas:
[W]e have said that Rule 9(b) pleading standards may be
relaxed, in an appropriate case, when the opposing party is the
only practical source for discovering the specific facts supporting
a pleader’s conclusion. In such cases, even for a plaintiff’s
allegations of fraud, if the facts would be peculiarly within the
defendants’ control, a court may allow some discovery before
requiring that plaintiff plead individual acts of fraud with
particularity.163
In Rost, the defendant was accused of submitting claims for
reimbursement to the government for off-label uses of prescriptions.164 The
relator, the former Vice President of Marketing in one of the defendant’s
divisions, pled that he had “no control over or dealings with such entities”
that were alleged to violate the FCA, and he therefore had “no access to the
records in [the defendant’s] possession.”165 In his complaint, Rost named
the distributors that promoted off-label uses, stated that the defendant
provided $200 per patient to physicians who prescribed the drug, and
alleged that the defendant hired promoters for the sole purpose of
determining how to promote the drug for off-label uses.166
Despite relying on Karvelas to dismiss the relator’s complaint, the
appellate court determined that “[a]t most, Rost raises facts that suggest
fraud was possible; but the complaint contained no factual or statistical
evidence to strengthen the inference of fraud beyond possibility” because
Rost never pled a specific claim.167 The court ignored its own clear
stating she did not have access to the documents demonstrates the danger of allowing the
court to arbitrarily allow or disallow a more relaxed pleading standard.
162. United States ex rel. Rost v. Pfizer, Inc., 507 F.3d 720 (1st Cir. 2007).
163. United States ex rel. Karvelas v. Melrose-Wakefield Hosp., 360 F.3d 220, 229 (1st
Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
164. Rost, 507 F.3d at 723.
165. Id. at 726.
166. Reply Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 17-18, United States ex rel. Rost v. Pfizer,
Inc., 507 F.3d 720 (1st Cir. 2007) (No. 06-2627).
167. Rost, 507 F.3d at 733.
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precedent, choosing to overlook the explicit claim that the defendant had
sole possession of the claims,168 causing the relator to have absolutely no
access to the information demanded by the court. Therefore, the relator was
unable to reach the details of specific claims for payment.
Although not requiring a relator to plead a specific claim when the
evidence is in the defendant’s control occasionally allows a relator to
appropriately plead a fraudulent scheme, the test is unreliable and still
retains an improper focus of the application of Rule 9(b) to a qui tam
complaint.
V. RULE 9(B) SHOULD NOT APPLY TO A QUI TAM COMPLAINT UNDER THE
FALSE CLAIMS ACT
Even though a majority of courts have determined that Rule 9(b) applies
to a qui tam action, the Rule should not apply to an action filed under the
False Claims Act.169 Facially, the FCA does not require fraud: “no specific
intent to defraud is required.”170 Rather, an FCA action is a statutory
violation not having any relation to a common law fraud charge, which is
the violation contemplated by Rule 9.171
The government or the relator in an FCA suit is not required to allege
fraud for every violation of the FCA. In other words, a person may violate
the FCA in other ways besides committing fraud. In the FCA, there are
seven specific provisions that identify what constitutes a violation.172 Three
of the primary provisions require either a “false or [a] fraudulent claim.”173
The key is the disjunctive “or”—a claim need not be fraudulent to violate
the statute. In the same vein, another provision requires the relator to allege
“a false record or statement”; fraud is not even a violation of this provision
of the FCA.174 Merely filing a false claim violates the FCA—no fraud is
required, thereby removing it from the scope of Rule 9(b).175
168. Even though the government would also have a copy of the claims at issue, the
courts uniformly describe the information to be in the defendant’s possession.
169. HELMER, supra note 9, at 357.
170. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1)(B) (2006 & Supp. 2009).
171. United States ex rel. Johnson v. Shell Oil Co., 183 F.R.D. 204, 208 (E.D. Tex.
1998).
172. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A)–(G); see supra note 58.
173. Id. § 3729(a)(1)(A)–(B).
174. Id. § 3729(a)(1)(G).
175. Helmer, while arguing that Rule 9(b) does not apply at all, nonetheless discusses
that even if Rule 9(b) does apply to a qui tam complaint, then it cannot require absolute
particularity. While not providing an explicit standard, he encourages the courts to find
another way to apply Rule 9(b) to a relator’s claim. HELMER, supra note 9, at 360.
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Further, the FCA does not require “specific intent to defraud.”176 The
statute does require that the actor “knowingly” commit the act, which may
be defined as “deliberate ignorance.”177 Such deliberate ignorance is not an
element of a claim for fraud. Therefore, since fraud is not required for a
violation of the FCA, the courts should not read such a requirement into the
pleading; Rule 9(b) should not be blindly applied to a qui tam complaint.
The Supreme Court recently stated that courts “should generally not
depart from the usual practice under the Federal Rules on the basis of
perceived policy concerns.”178 In other words, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure should not be extended beyond their typical application and
intended purpose. Rule 9(b) should not be expanded to apply to the FCA, a
situation where fraud is not required for a violation.179 Such actions are not
contemplated by the Rule itself. The courts have determined in qui tam case
law that the policy concerns reflected in Rule 9(b) are manifest in qui tam
actions, forcing qui tam complaints to satisfy Rule 9(b). Such action is an
inappropriate extension of the courts’ power.
Simply because fraud is one way an actor may violate the FCA, it does
not follow that the courts should apply Rule 9(b) to every qui tam
complaint. If fraud is not alleged, pleading with particularity should not be
demanded at all, since that complaint does not fall under the scope of the
Rule. The words of the Supreme Court and the statute’s absence of fraud as
a requirement demonstrate that Rule 9(b) should not automatically apply to
all qui tam complaints. Regretfully, the courts have refused to undergo
appropriate analysis, and they routinely apply Rule 9(b) to any and all qui
tam actions, whether there is an allegation of fraud or not. While it is ideal,
and legally appropriate, for Rule 9(b) not to be applied to any aspect of a
qui tam complaint, it is far from the current state of the law. Therefore, it is
necessary for the courts to employ a standard that balances the particularity
requirement of Rule 9(b) with the short and plain pleading requirement of
Rule 8.

176. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b).
177. Id. § 3729(b)(1)(A)(ii). Deliberate ignorance is not fraud and is not construed as
fraudulent intent, thus providing more evidence that not every action that may violate the
FCA requires fraud.
178. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007).
179. But see 27 FEDERAL PROCEDURE, LAWYER’S EDITION, 667 (Francis M. Dougherty
ed., 2008) (“The particularity requirement of Rule 9(b) extends to all averments of fraud or
mistake, whatever the theory of legal duty—statutory, tort, contractual, or fiduciary.”).
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VI. WHAT CAN BE DONE: PLEADING A FRAUDULENT
SCHEME WITH PARTICULARITY
In order to preserve the integrity of the False Claims Act and permit
relators to function as assistants to the government, it is essential for the
courts to adopt a proper interpretation of particularity under Rule 9(b). The
“unique aspects of the FCA suggest that rigorous application of Rule 9(b)
would undermine the Act. The Act is designed to encourage private
individuals to report and pursue allegations of fraud against the
Government.”180 Although some circuits have applied a “relaxed”
particularity,181 proper complaints still fail because the courts apply Rule
9(b) particularity to the wrong element of an action under the FCA. This
results in the courts undermining the FCA and, in essence, allowing Rule
9(b) to gut the power of a qui tam relator.
A violation of the FCA essentially requires three elements: (1) there was
a claim for a federal fund; (2) the claim was false; and (3) the defendant
knew of its falsity.182 Unfortunately, when the courts demand that a relator
plead with particularity under Rule 9(b),183 the relator is required to plead
all three elements with particularity. However, this application is
erroneous.184 Even though the FCA does not require any evidence of
fraudulent intent for a violation, if the courts persist in applying Rule 9(b)
to any FCA case, the heightened pleading requirement should only be
applied to the element that most closely reflects fraudulent intent. Thus,
courts should require the identification of a “scheme” to receive federal
funds when the actor is not entitled to them. Therefore, Rule 9(b) should be
applied only to the knowledge element of the action.
In an effort to align the purposes of the FCA, Rule 9(b), and Rule 8,
courts should adopt the following standard:

180. SYLVIA, supra note 23, at 537.
181. See discussion supra Part IV.
182. United States ex rel. Aflatooni v. Kitsap Physician Serv., 314 F.3d 995, 1000 (9th
Cir. 2002); United States ex rel. Darrig v. Med. Consultants Network, Inc., No. 04-650-HA,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80789, at *5-6 (D. Or. Nov. 2, 2006), rev’d and remanded, 303 F.
App’x 429 (9th Cir. 2008); United States ex rel. Stewart v. La. Clinic, No. 99-1767, 2003
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9401, at *28 (E.D. La. June 4, 2003).
183. It is questionable that Rule 9(b) should even be applied to a qui tam complaint. See
supra Part V.
184. As discussed in this Comment, such an application places an unreasonable burden
on the relator when more often than not he does not have access to the claims despite
firsthand knowledge of the defendant’s scheme.
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When a relator identifies with particularity a defendant’s
fraudulent scheme, the complaint is pled with sufficient
particularity under Rule 9(b).
Under this standard, Rule 9(b) is applied to the third element of an FCA
violation: the defendant’s knowledge of falsity.185 Such a standard not only
allows the government to benefit from those citizens willing to assist the
government in uncovering false claims, but it also protects the FCA
defendants. Complaints satisfying this standard provide defendants with
sufficient detail and information to curtail spurious charges and allow them
to prepare an adequate response to the allegations, a key purpose in
applying Rule 9 to a qui tam complaint.186 This standard will also prevent
relators from overcompensating with unnecessary verbiage in the
complaints, thus also furthering the current pleading strictures under Rule 8.
Consider two illustrations demonstrating how this standard will further
the purposes of the FCA and Rule 9(b).
Joe works as a nurse at a major hospital. An executive calls a staff
meeting where he states that each time a patient comes in and is treated for
a cold, the nurse working with the doctor is to change the diagnosis and
treatment on the chart to pneumonia, thus obtaining more money from
Medicare or Medicaid.187 Joe continues in his normal job, routinely
observing patient charts and altering the doctors’ diagnoses on the charts
from “cold” to “pneumonia.” After a few months, Joe decides that the
scheme is wrong and that he has to do something. He goes to the managing
nurse and tells him that the hospital is cheating Medicare. His superior asks

185. The First Circuit recently determined that “providing ‘factual or statistical evidence
to strengthen the inference of fraud beyond possibility’” only when the “defendant induced
third parties to file false claims with the government” would be sufficient. United States ex
rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech Prods., L.P., 579 F.3d 13, 29 (1st Cir. 2009). While this may
allow a relator to allege a fraudulent scheme if he had sufficient indicia of reliability in this
one circumstance, the First Circuit did not overrule Karvelas or provide any relaxation for
other qui tam claims. Nonetheless, Duxbury represents a beacon of hope that the courts may
be moving toward adopting the standard proposed in this Comment.
186. See supra note 23.
187. This fraudulent scheme is known as “upcoding.” “‘Upcoding,’ a common form of
Medicare fraud, is the practice of billing Medicare for medical services or equipment
designated under a code that is more expensive than what a patient actually needed or was
provided, and is the source of much litigation under the False Claims Act.” United States ex
rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys., 501 F.3d 493, 498 n.2 (6th Cir. 2007). For more details on
different types of fraudulent schemes, see JOEL D. HESCH, WHISTLEBLOWING: HOW TO
COLLECT MILLIONS OF DOLLARS FOR REPORTING FRAUD, A GUIDE TO GOVERNMENT REWARD
PROGRAMS (2008).
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Joe if he has ever seen any claims being sent to Medicare—how would he
know what is being paid? He is told to continue in the routine or be fired.
Joe then files a qui tam complaint, alleging that the hospital knew that
each common cold treated at the hospital was billed to Medicare as
pneumonia. Joe does not work in the hospital’s billing or accounting
department, so he cannot plead any specific invoices or claim numbers. He
can, however, provide eyewitness testimony from the meeting that there is a
fraudulent scheme occurring, and he can state that when he drew his
supervisor’s attention to the illegality of the scheme, the supervisor told him
to ignore the implications. After the complaint is unsealed and served on
the defendant hospital, Joe is greeted with a motion to dismiss under Rule
9(b).
Regretfully, under the current application of Rule 9(b), even though Joe
can name doctors who reported pneumonia, the time period the upcoding
occurred, the meetings in which he participated, and the fact that he had a
one-on-one conversation with the head nurse, he cannot point to a specific
claim or invoice sent to the government. His complaint is dismissed for lack
of particularity, leaving the government without the help of a willing
relator.
Under this Comment’s proposed standard, Joe’s complaint would satisfy
the particularity required by Rule 9(b). Joe would be able to describe the
fraudulent scheme in firsthand detail, with names of individuals in the
meeting and the time he saw the upcoding. He would also be able to
identify the hospital’s actual knowledge of falsity, since he can cite the
conversation with the head nurse.188 Furthermore, he sat in the meetings
where the entire scheme was outlined, witnessed the patients entering with
a common cold, and saw the charts being altered to reflect treatment for
pneumonia. Joe can plead the fraudulent scheme with particularity,
satisfying the strictures of Rule 9(b).
Consider another situation. A project manager who has been hired by the
military to build aircraft tells Mike to use Grade B metal to build the
aircraft. This is different than the metal the company used for the last few
hundred planes; in fact, it is much cheaper. Mike follows his instructions,
but discovers that under that contract, they were supposed to use only
Grade A metal for the projects. Mike approaches the president of the
company, telling him his concern about using Grade B instead of Grade A
metal. The president asks if Mike has seen any such claims being submitted
to the government. Since Mike is only a technician building the craft, he
188. It is essential to remember that at this stage of the litigation, Joe is not proving
liability; he is merely putting the defendant on notice in order to prepare a response.
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cannot point to any exact claims; Mike is certain, however, that Grade B
metal should not be used. Mike is ignored and told to do his job.
Mike, after talking to the other workers, finds that this is not the first
time that Grade B metal has been used under identical contracts with the
government. He files a qui tam action under the FCA, alleging that the
company he works for has been using Grade B metal while receiving
payment for aircraft built with Grade A metal.
Once again, if the defendant moved for dismissal under the current
application of Rule 9(b), Mike would be left in the cold and could not assist
the government in recovering the money that was obtained through the false
claims. Under the standard proposed in this Comment, however, his
complaint would satisfy the particularity demanded by Rule 9(b) because he
could accurately describe the situation where the project manager instructed
the use of the improper metal, the president was aware of the situation, and
improper metal was consistently used in producing the aircraft. Even
though he does not have access to an exact invoice, he can plead the general
scheme with sufficient particularity; the company is using cheaper metal
and billing the government for the expensive Grade A metal.
VII. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: ATTEMPTING A LEGISLATIVE
REMEDY FOR THE CIRCUIT CONFUSION AND MISAPPLICATION
For over twenty years, the 1986 amendments to the False Claims Act
have reigned as the government’s primary anti-fraud tool. Recently,
Congress has once again decided that it is necessary to reevaluate the FCA.
Due to the misapplication of Rule 9(b), the House of Representatives has
included a legislative amendment that will address the misapplication
among the circuits. The House has proposed:
In pleading an action brought under section 3730(b), a person
shall not be required to identify specific claims that result from
an alleged course of misconduct if the facts alleged in the
complaint, if ultimately proven true, would provide a reasonable
indication that one or more violations of section 3729 are likely
to have occurred, and if the allegations in the pleading provide
adequate notice of the specific nature of the alleged misconduct
to permit the Government effectively to investigate and
defendants fairly to defend the allegations made.189

189. False Claims Act Correction Act of 2007, H.R. Res. 4854, 110th Cong § 4(e)
(2007).
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This proposed legislative fix reflects the balance offered in this Comment to
remedy the circuit confusion and the application of Rule 9(b) to the FCA.
The proposed amendment may require even less particularity in a qui tam
complaint than this Comment’s proposal that a relator be allowed to plead
the defendant’s knowledge of a fraudulent scheme.190
A. The Legislature May Override a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
The House of Representatives’ proposal raises the question of whether
the legislature has the authority to overrule a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure. Under the Rules Enabling Act,191 “The Supreme Court shall
have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and
rules of evidence for cases in the United States district courts (including
proceedings before magistrate judges thereof) and courts of appeals.”192
Therefore, the legislature has authorized the Court to promulgate its own
rules of procedure, including Rule 9(b).
However, Congress does possess the authority to statutorily override a
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.193 When evaluating the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and its relationship to Rule 8, the Tenth Circuit made the
determination that “there is no contest as to the plenary power of Congress
to statutorily supersede any or all of the Rules. But unless the congressional
intent to do so clearly appears, subsequently enacted statutes ought to be
construed to harmonize with the Rules, if feasible.”194 In other words, when
Congress makes it clear that the purpose of the statute is to override the
application of a Rule, then the statute is the standing procedural law. If the
intent is clear, it must be read to comply with the Court’s rules of
procedure.
The Northern District of Texas agreed, ruling that a statute, when
Congressional intent is clear, preempted Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
17(b).195 The court held that the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
190. See infra Part VI.
191. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077 (2006).
192. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a).
193. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Consol. Fibers, Inc., 7 F. Supp. 2d 822
(N.D. Tex. 1998).
194. United States v. Gustin-Bacon Div., Certain-Teed Prods. Corp., 426 F.2d 539, 542
(10th Cir. 1970).
195. BNSF, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 829. CERCLA governs a corporation’s capacity to be sued,
which is normally governed by state law, and the capacity to be sued is delineated in FED. R.
CIV. P. 17(b). The court determined that the intent behind CERCLA, a federal statute, was
evident, in that it should preempt state statutes as well as the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
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Compensation and Liability Act not only preempts state statutes, but also
overrides the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, when the congressional
intent is clear or the statute creates “a regulatory scheme which wholly
conflicts with the state statute.”196
The First Circuit followed suit in its Grossman v. Johnson197 decision. In
determining that a shareholder’s action had to properly satisfy the FRCP,
the Court determined that there was insufficient evidence that Congress
desired to override or add to a rule of civil procedure. The Court reiterated:
“In the absence of a clear inconsistency or a demonstrated congressional
purpose to exclude one or more of the Federal Rules, a subsequently
enacted statute should be so construed as to harmonize with the Federal
Rules if that is at all feasible.”198
B. The False Claims Act Amendment Intends To Override Rule 9(b)
Since the Amendments have not yet been enacted, the congressional
record thus far is limited to a brief discussion contained within the House
Record. In the congressional record, the purpose behind the amendment to
the FCA is clear: to override the courts that have inappropriately dismissed
relators’ claims when they properly allege a fraudulent scheme but fail to
plead a specific false claim, providing greater flexibility in the pleading of
an action under the FCA. In introducing the proposed amendments,
Congressman Howard Berman199 of California stated:
Many courts unreasonably have barred whistleblowers with
potentially meritorious claims from pursuing cases. For example,
the courts have dismissed cases brought by insiders who know
key details of fraudulent schemes because they can’t plead
specific details of the billing documentation, such as the dates
and identification numbers of invoices—information ordinarily
sought and obtained in discovery.200
There is no question of the Congressional intent behind this proposed
amendment to the FCA. It intends to override the courts’ current
196. BNSF, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 826.
197. Grossman v. Johnson, 674 F.2d 115 (1st Cir. 1982).
198. Id. at 122-23 (emphasis added). The court evaluated the fact that in this instance,
Congress had cited to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as an appropriate safeguard in
securities and distributions circumstances.
199. Congressman Berman, along with Senator Charles Grassley, sponsored the 1986
Amendments to the FCA.
200. 153 CONG. REC. E2658, E2658 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 2007) (statement of Rep.
Berman).
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misapplication of Rule 9(b) to a qui tam complaint and provide greater
flexibility in the pleading of an action under the FCA.
After witnessing the functioning of the FCA for the last twenty-two
years,201 Congress now considers amending the FCA in order to fulfill the
underlying purposes of the FCA. “The law has not been a success in one
critical respect: it could be doing far more.”202 This includes providing a
proper pleading standard for a relator’s qui tam complaint:
The amendments proposed in this legislation will remove
these debilitating qualifications and to [sic] clarify that the Act is
intended to “reach all types of fraud, without qualification”
leading to Government losses. We intend for these amendments
to apply to all future cases as well as all cases that are pending in
the courts on the date the amendments become law.
The Amendments’ most critical goals are the following: . . .
[c]larifying that plaintiffs do not need to have access to
individual claims data or documents to bring a False Claims Act
case.203
It cannot be clearer that Congress’s intent behind amending the FCA is to
allow a relator to plead “an alleged course of misconduct” that would
appropriately direct the defendant to prepare a sufficient defense based on
the complaint itself.204 Congressman Berman makes explicit reference to
the types of cases described in this Comment as an improper application of
Rule 9(b), leaving an unmistakably clear path of intent to override Rule
9(b).
In addition to the statement of the Congressman himself, testimony at the
Congressional hearings on the amendments reveals the purpose behind the

201. In the words of Representative Berman:
I am very happy to report that, in the years since 1986, the amended Act has
returned over $20 billion to the United States Government that otherwise would
have been lost to fraud. For the most part, the law has been a resounding
success. The Government has received full compensation for many of its
losses, and has also imposed financial penalties on many who have knowingly
over-billed the Government.
Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at E2658-59.
204. False Claims Act Correction Act of 2007, H.R. Res. 4854, 110th Cong. § 4(e)
(2008).
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proposed amendment. The testimony of Shelley R. Slade,205 an attorney
specializing in whistleblower litigation, explained why the amendment is
necessary:
The courts are misguided in applying this aspect of Rule 9(b)
jurisprudence in the FCA context. In contrast to common law
fraud cases, the qui tam plaintiff in a FCA lawsuit is not a party
to the fraudulent transaction. It is the United States . . . that is the
party to the transaction. It is consequently unreasonable to expect
the qui tam plaintiff to have access to the transactional
documents, which are almost always held exclusively by the
wrongdoer on the one hand, and the government itself on the
other.206
Congressional intent is clear: the purpose of the pleading standard in the
False Claims Act Correction Act of 2007 is to overrule Rule 9(b) and the
courts’ various misconstructions of that Rule. With the intent clearly in the
fore, the Rule will be officially preempted and relators will be granted the
appropriate pleading standard under the amended False Claims Act.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The near universal application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) to
a relator’s qui tam complaint under the False Claims Act is undermining the
very purpose behind the Act. When the courts demand that a relator plead a
specific claim, the relator is unable to ever satisfy the stringent particularity
pleading standard. Since the courts have held that Rule 9(b) should be
applied to a qui tam complaint, the courts must impose a standard that
allows a relator to plead a specific fraudulent scheme, applying the
particularity of Rule 9(b) to the knowledge of falsity aspect of the FCA.
While the House of Representatives has proposed an appropriate answer
to the misapplication of Rule 9(b) by crafting the False Claims Act
Amendments to override the Rule, it is uncertain whether the legislative
solution will be enacted. Whether Congress approves the amendments or
205. Slade is a partner in the Washington, D.C. firm of Vogel, Slade, & Goldstein, LLP,
which specializes in whistleblower litigation. She was also named one of the top
whistleblowing attorneys in The Washingtonian. See http://www.washingtonian.com/
articles/mediapolitics/5907.html#whistleblower. For more information about Ms. Slade, see
http://www.false-claims-act-health-care-fraud-whistleblower-attorney.com/index.php.
206. False Claims Act Correction Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R. 4854 Before the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 24 (2008) (statement of Shelley R. Slade, Partner,
Vogel, Slade & Goldstein, LLP).
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not, however, the only way to permit full functionality of the FCA is to alter
the overwhelming application of Rule 9(b) to the claim element of the qui
tam action. By allowing a relator to plead a fraudulent scheme with
particularity, the purposes of the FCA, as well as the purposes of requiring
fraud to be pled with particularity, will be appropriately balanced, saving
the government millions of dollars each year.

